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Health professionals have an ethical duty . . .
Alan Williams Centre for Health Economics, University of York
New testament
The British Medical Association (BMA) recently
published guidance from its medical ethics
committee on decision making concerning the
withholding and withdrawing of life-prolonging
medical treatment.1 It is a very thoughtful and
thought-provoking document, the ramifications of
which go far beyond the immediate situation it is
addressing. The authors are clearly well aware of
this. When considering a doctor’s ethical response
to “contemporaneous requests for life-prolonging
treatment” made by competent patients, the com-
mittee observes:
“Although patients’ wishes should always be
discussed with them, the fact that a patient has
requested a particular treatment does not mean
that it must always be provided.”2
They advance four propositions in support of
this conclusion, namely:
“(a) Health professionals are not obliged to
provide any treatment which cannot produce the
desired benefit”.3
“(b) There is no obligation to provide any
treatment which is clearly contrary to an individu-
al’s health interests. A life-prolonging treatment
may, for example, prolong life but result in severe
pain or loss of function so that overall it produces
severe harm to the patient”.4
“(c) Except in an emergency situation, doctors are
not obliged to treat contrary to their conscience
(though they may be obliged to make an
appropriate referral)”.4
“(d) Where resources are limited, it is inevitable
that some patients will not receive all of the treat-
ment they request even though such treatment
could be potentially beneficial to them”.4
Towards the end of their commentary on the last
of these propositions, they observe:
“Health professionals have an ethical duty to
make the best use of the available resources and
this means that hard decisions must be made.
Whilst this is a much broader issue than can be
discussed thoroughly in this document, it is clear
that doctors are not obliged to comply with
patients’ requests for treatment when they make
inequitable demands on scarce resources”.5
Later they come back to this issue in the context of
patients who have lost or never attained compe-
tence. In that connection they observe:
“Existing guidelines and court judgments have
insisted that non-treatment decisions for people
who lack the ability to make or communicate
decisions should be based on considerations of
benefit to the patient and not cost. It is obvious,
however, that money spent caring for irreversibly
and severely brain-damaged patients is money
which cannot be used to treat other patients. This
is an issue which needs to be acknowledged and
addressed on a national scale as part of the debate
on rationing and prioritising resources”.6
Exegesis
Taking these propositions one by one, and scruti-
nising them a little more closely, the following
intricacies come to light:
a) On the face of it this appears to be no more
than the assertion that there is no obligation to
do things that are ineVective. But failure to
produce the “desired” benefit is not the same
as failure to produce any benefit. The measure-
ment and valuation of benefit depends on the
perspective adopted. What the patient values,
what the patient’s nearest and dearest value,
what the doctor values, what management
values, and what the general public values, may
all be diVerent. In the present context it
appears that the point being made is that the
specific outcome that the patient wants is
something that the experts know cannot be
delivered by the treatment in question. But
what if the treatment would deliver some
appreciable benefit from society’s viewpoint,
but not enough to satisfy the patient? For
instance, the treatment might eventually make
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the patient suYciently independent to leave
hospital and move to a nursing home, but the
patient wants only to be independent enough
to return home and manage there even without
an informal carer, and the experts know that
this is impossible. In such circumstances
should the treatment be withheld because it
fails to meet the patient’s quite unrealistic
expectations? Or is the acid test the potential
benefits as valued by someone who does have
realistic expectations? Is it perhaps the expert
who thinks that the benefits will be insuY-
ciently desirable to be worthwhile? If so, (a)
can be subsumed under (d). Until we know
who is doing the desiring, it is diYcult to inter-
pret this case.
b) Here “an individual’s health interests” are dis-
tinguished from an individual’s wishes. Pre-
sumably an individual’s interests are being
judged by a third party whose wishes override
those of the patient. This cannot be happening
because of ignorance on the part of the patient,
because we are here dealing with competent
patients who can presumably assimilate the
relevant information. It must therefore be due
to the value system of the patient being
replaced by somebody else’s value system (the
doctor’s, the society’s?). The specific example
given suggests that the prospect with treatment
is for the patient to be left in a health state
which the third party regards as being worse
than being dead, but which the patient does
not. So it is a simple case of whose values shall
count. Presumably in the converse case it
would be held that if the patient wished to die
but the third party did not think that the situ-
ation was that bad, the patient’s values would
again be overridden. I am a little surprised by
this position in the case of competent patients.
c) I have nothing worthwhile to say on the subject
of conscientious objection to some treatments
on the part of some doctors, except to observe
that it should be acknowledged that there is
also conscientious objection to some treat-
ments among some patients.
d) The initial phrase “where resources are
limited” seems redundant, since resources are
always limited. But it is interesting to note that
whereas the earlier propositions were about
what doctors’ obligations were, statement (d)
simply refers to the inevitability of the fact that
patients will not always get what they want
even when it is potentially beneficial to them.
This lack of moral content is remedied a little
later with the assertion that health profession-
als have an ethical duty to make the best use of
the available resources. Most people would
interpret this to mean that they have an
obligation to be eYcient, in the high level sense
of ensuring that health gains are maximised.
But here the best use of resources is held to
justify the disqualification of patients who
make “inequitable” demands on scarce re-
sources, thus shifting the ground into the field
of distributive justice.
The final paragraph quoted above says no more
than that costs and benefits must be systematically
compared, and weighed one against the other, and
that it is just as unethical to concentrate on
benefits and ignore costs, as it is to concentrate on
costs and ignore benefits. Quite so. This is an issue
which needs to be acknowledged and addressed
on a national scale as part of the debate on ration-
ing and prioritising resources. Again, quite so. I
think it would be a great service to the citizenry of
the UK if the BMA’s ethics committee would
itself oVer a substantial contribution to that
debate, especially if it were as thoughtful and
even-handed as this one. Assuming that they will
in fact rise to the occasion, I would like to oVer
them some gratuitous advice!
My advice is prompted by a desire to refine the
following nuggets extracted from the material
cited above:
1) The benefits of health care comprise improve-
ments both in the length and in the quality of
people’s lives, and each may be traded oV
against the other. This sounds remarkably like
scene-setting for the QALY (Quality Adjusted
Life Years) as a measure of health benefit.
2) The valuation of such benefits does not have to
come from individual current patients. I would
argue that in a tax-financed system serving the
entire population, the relevant source of valua-
tions should be the general citizenry, each of
whom will have to weigh up the conflict they
face individually between their role as potential
patients and their role as actual taxpayers.
3) Opportunity costs are a key element in all this,
both from an eYciency and from an equity
standpoint, since they represent the health
benefits foregone by those who did not get
treated. This looks like scene-setting for cost-
per-QALY calculations with equity weights.
4) The systematic comparison of costs and
benefits is the crux of the matter. Read on
........
Proselytising
There is more to cost-benefit analysis than gener-
alised discussion of advantages and disadvantages.
It represents the outcome of much hard thinking
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about what is involved when we seek a systematic
answer to the question: do the benefits of a certain
action outweigh its costs? It proves to be very dif-
ficult even to formulate the question satisfactorily,
and attempting to answer it frequently impresses
one with the vast area of ignorance that pervades
even quite commonplace activities. At that stage,
therefore, the weak-spirited usually abandon the
cost-benefit approach as too demanding, and
return with relief to more comfortable ways.
The trouble with the more comfortable ways is
that they foster the illusion that, if cost-benefit
analysis is not done, the issues which it poses can
be avoided, whereas the reality is that these issues
are still present, and they all still have to be
resolved. If health services planning is not to be
based on the principle that unwitting decisions are
likely to be better than witting decisions, then the
cost-benefit approach must become part of every
decision maker’s intellectual equipment.
As a homely contribution to the furtherance of
that worthy cause, I oVer the following “check-
list” of basic questions that should be asked every
time anyone makes a studied recommendation
about the use of resources. If it is impossible even
to discern any material relevant to the questions,
be especially on your guard, since the questions
will have been answered by making assumptions,
which may be unrealistic and/or unsupportable
and/or unacceptable.
A basic check-list of questions runs as follows:
1. What precisely was the question that the study
was trying to answer?
2. What is the question that it has actually
answered?
3. What are the assumed objectives of the activity
studied?
4. By what measures are these represented?
5. How are they weighted?
6. Do they enable us to tell whether the objectives
are being attained?
7. What range of options was considered?
8. What other options might there have been?
9. Were they rejected, or not considered, for good
reason?
10. Would their inclusion have been likely to
change the results?
11. Is anyone likely to be aVected who has not
been considered in the analysis?
12. If so, why are they excluded?
13. Does the notion of cost go wider or deeper
than the expenditure of the agency con-
cerned?
14. If not, is it clear that these expenditures cover
all the resources used, and accurately repre-
sent their value if released for other uses?
15. If so, is the line drawn so as to include all
potential beneficiaries and losers, and are the
resources costed at their value in their best
alternative use?
16. Is the diVerential timing of the items in the
streams of benefits and costs suitably taken
care of (for example, by discounting, and, if
so, at what rate)?
17. Where there is uncertainty, or there are
known margins of error, is it made clear how
sensitive the outcome is to these elements?
18. Are the results, on balance, good enough for
the job in hand?
19. Has anyone else done better?
The last two have been added because I do not
want to be accused of advocating a counsel of per-
fection. Decisions have to be made, and will con-
tinue to be made, on the basis of imperfect knowl-
edge. But I am anxious to ensure that we know
how little we know when we do what we have to
do.
Postscript
Everything in that preceding section was taken
word for word from an article I published in the
British Medical Bulletin7 twenty-five years ago,
which was recently republished, together with
other neglected pearls of wisdom, in a book of
essays entitled Being Reasonable about the Econom-
ics of Health.8 My apologies to any of you who have
all that engraved on your heart, but it seems to me
that there are still many people grappling with
priority-setting issues who seem quite unaware of
what they are getting into and where they might
turn for help. Amongst the far-sighted people who
appreciated the centrality of these issues a quarter
of a century ago were Douglas Black, Archie
Cochrane and Bryan Jennett. They deserve great
credit for helping to ensure that what were then
regarded as rather outrageously heretical views,
about the role of economics in relation to the
practice of medicine, continued to be brought to
the notice of their colleagues. Even then they were
of the view that health professionals have an ethi-
cal duty to make the best use of the available
resources, but that they needed help in doing so.
There are, however, still many people who seem
to believe that there is something fundamentally
unethical about bringing economic appraisal
techniques to bear on health care priority setting,
at both the clinical and the planning levels.
Concerning these ethical implications, I have
observed elsewhere9 that:
“the evaluation of health care activities is an ethi-
cal minefield, strewn with explosive material not
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easily detected by the naked eye, but .... bringing
this material out into the open and analysing it
(both by logical discourse and by empirical
enquiry) is an important extension of the analyst’s
role. I think it is our duty to rush in where others
fear to tread, even if in the process we find
ourselves being maligned as insensitive trouble-
makers, and even if the misguided criticise our
analytical techniques because they require quite
strong ethical assumptions to be made. It is not
that any of these analytical techniques are ethical
or unethical per se, it is more a matter of ensuring
that their particular assumptions are appropriate
in the context in which they are being used.”10
Thus one cannot but welcome even-handed
reviews of the strengths and weakness of the
QALY approach to the evaluation of health care
such as those produced recently by the Ethical
QALY Group11 and by McKie et al.12 But the
proof of the pudding is in the eating, and in the
UK we shall soon discover how much real
progress has been made in winning hearts and
minds by the performance (and impact) of the
National Institute for Clinical Excellence (and
Cost-eVectiveness)? If it is successful in prioritis-
ing health care according to cost-eVectiveness
principles, 25 years will not have been too long to
wait ......
Alan Williams is Professor of Economics at the Centre
for Health Economics, the University of York.
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